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Identifying

Misleading

Advertising

J. EDWARDRUSSO
BARBARAL. METCALF
DEBRASTEPHENS*
A procedurefor identifyingmisleadingadvertisingis presented, based solely on
measuredconsumerbeliefs. An advertisementis misleadingif an exposed group
holds morefalse beliefs than a comparisongroup.Whenten allegedlymisleading
advertisementswere tested, two were identifiedas incrementallymisleading,and
fourothers were shown to be exploitivelymisleading.

Fords? Manufacturersthemselves are generally unable or
unwilling to provideconsumerswith substantiationfor such
claims (Corey and Patti 1979). The final presumption is
that not all claim-fact discrepancies can be corrected by
naturalmarketmechanisms(Eighmey 1978). In some cases
the marketis self-correcting, as when a false claim is corrected by a competitor's advertising. And, of course, economic self-interest dictates the correction of any false
impressions of one's own products that reduce sales. In
spite of some self-correction, however, there are many instances where naturalmarket mechanisms are inadequate.
Clearly, claim-fact discrepancies do exist at market equilibrium, and misleading advertisingdoes increase sales.
These presumptionsimpose two requirementson any solution to the problemof misleading advertising.There must
be some extramarket,institutionalizedsystem for detecting
misleading advertising. Such a regulatory system may be
public, private, or mixed (as we currently have in the
United States). Second, whatevercombinationof public or
private institutions regulates advertising, there should be
some equitable, standardprocedure to determine whether
an ad is misleading. The focus of this paper is on such a
procedure.

whether an ad is misleading continues to
Determining
prove difficult and controversial.Naturally, advertisers and consumer advocates rarely agree on whethera particular ad is misleading. More disappointing, however, is
the failure of researchersto agree on a broadly applicable
definitionof misleadingness or a procedurefor identifying
it (Gardner1975; Jacoby and Small 1975; Preston 1976).
The problemis furthercomplicatedby the conflict between
the behavioralparadigmof researchersand the jurisprudential view of regulatoryorganizations.
In this paper, we propose and test a procedurefor identifying misleadingadvertising.Contraryto custom, the proceduralproblemis confrontedfirst, and a definitionof misleadingness follows. The procedure is empirically based,
as it relies on the measurementof consumer beliefs.

Presumptions
We make certain presumptionswhen we speak of misleading advertising. First and most important is the discrepancybetween the claims of an ad and the facts of actual
productperformance.'If such a discrepancydoes not exist,
no one can be misled. The second presumptionis that consumers cannot by themselvescorrect all claim-fact discrepancies. Individual consumers cannot correct some claims
because verification is technically impossible or prohibitively expensive. For example, how can the ordinaryconsumer determine whether Volvos are built better than

THREE APPROACHES TO UNJUST
ADVERTISING
One may best understandour procedurein the context
of three alternativeviews of unjust advertising:fraud, falsity, and misleadingness.2 These views parallel the three

*J. EdwardRusso is Associate Professor and BarbaraL. Metcalf is a
former Research Project Manager, both at the GraduateSchool of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637. Debra Stephens is a
doctoralcandidatein the Departmentof Behavioral Sciences, University
of Chicago. This article has benefited from the comments of Julie A.
Edell, Hillel J. Einhom, Michael B. Mazis, Andrew A. Mitchell, John
Paul Russo, and especially from those of Ivan L. Preston. The senior
author acknowledges Jacob Jacoby for introducinghim to the problem,
and Jeffery Godlis and Michael Hyman for collaborationon an early pilot
study. This researchwas supportedin partby GrantDAR 76-81806 from
the National Science Foundation.

'A major assertion of this paper is that the focus of misleading advertising should shift from "an advertisement'sclaims" to "consumer beliefs." This change is discussed shortly. Until then, we continue to use
the traditionalterm, claims.
2Thereis some confusion among the jurisprudential,scientific, and ordinary meanings of the terminology of misleading advertising. We use
unjustadvertising as a superordinatelabel, andfraudulent,false, and misleading as distinct subordinates. Not used are the two terms Congress
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components of an advertising communication:the advertiser, the message itself, and the resultantconsumerbeliefs
about the advertisedproduct.

Fraud
Fraudfocuses on the advertiserand assumes a deliberate
intent to create false beliefs about the product. We believe
that fraud is neither a valid nor practical approach. It is
invalid because the advertiser'sintent may be irrelevantto
the harm done to consumers. It is impracticalbecause the
requirement of proof of intent makes it difficult to take
action against the ad, and thereby stop the harmit is doing
to consumers.
For both reasons, fraud plays a declining role in current
regulatorypractice. The FederalTradeCommissionhas not
been requiredto prove intent for over 30 years.3Similarly,
the main industryregulator, the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the Better Business Bureau, does not need
to prove fraud in order to find that an ad should be withdrawn (Ashmen, Hasenjaeger, Hunt, Katz, Miracle, Preston, and Schultz 1979, p. 57). Unfortunately,currentstatutes still requireproof of fraud in some situations, such as
the U.S. Postal Service's regulationof advertisingthrough
the mails.

Falsity
Falsity in advertisingrefers to the existence of a claimfact discrepancy. Examples include price and availability
claims, as when a vendor advertisesa productat a reduced
price. "Literal truthfulness"requiresboth that the item be
sold at the advertisedprice and also that a reasonablenumber of such items be available for sale.
In order to demonstratefalsity in advertising, one must
verify the existence of a discrepancy. For prices, this is a
simple task, accomplished with numerical certainty. For
availability, however, it becomes more complicated. What
is the minimumnumberof advertiseditems a vendor must
have available for purchase? To answer such questions,
numericalcertaintymust give way to subjectivejudgment.
The most common approachis the use of expert testimony;
but, of course, experts do not always agree. Especially if
the issue is important,experts can usually be found to support each opposing viewpoint.
Standardizationof Meaning. The usefulness of the falsity approachis greatly enhanced if a regulatoryinstitution
has the power to standardizethe meaningof critical words.
wrote into the FTC's mandatedeclaring "unfairor deceptive" advertising
to be unlawful. Unfair has a special legal meaning (Cohen 1974), and
deception's ordinarymeaning, which connotes the intent to mislead, differs too widely from its legal meaning, misleadingness, whetherintended
or not. The terms misrepresentationand misperceptionlmiscomprehension
are avoided because they suggest the locus of blame, the advertiserand
the consumer, respectively.
3For brief histories of the FTC's regulation of advertising, see Jentz
(1968), Chapter 9 of Preston (1975), or the broader review of Aaker
(1974).

How else can one resolve the falsity of a claim like "nutritious"?There is some nutritionalvalue in even the worst
junk food, and experts do not agree on what constitutes a
"nutritious"food. Standardizationof meaningremoves the
ambiguityand potential misleadingnessof such terms.
Standardizationhas become a widely used regulatory
strategy. Many trade associations regulatethe use of product descriptions, and governmental agencies standardize
productlabels. For example, the Departmentof Agriculture
sets standards for grades of fruits, and even determines
whethera productname, like peanutbutter, can be used at
all. As "unconscionable lies" have disappearedfrom advertising, the role of standardizationof meaning has become increasinglyimportantin demonstratingthe falsity of
an advertisedclaim.4
Insufficiency of Falsity. In spite of the efficacy of a
demonstrationof falsity, it is neither sufficient nor necessary to prove that an ad is misleading. What mattersis what
consumersbelieve. A false claim does not harmconsumers
unless it is believed, and a true claim can cause great harm
if it generates a false belief.
Some false claims are clearly harmless. Fanciful cartoon
characters,though literally false, can enhance the belief of
a valid claim. Similarly, true claims can create false, harmful beliefs. Consider the following (hypothetical) audio
commercial: "Aren't you tired of the sniffles and runny
noses all winter? Tired of always feeling less than your
best? Get through a whole winter without colds. Take Eradicold pills as directed" (Harris1977; Harrisand Monaco
1978). The ad's claim that Eradicoldpills will preventwinter colds is not linguistically asserted, yet it is clearly implied. Preston(1975, p. 7) describes a television ad for toy
racing cars that the FTC found to be deceptive. Through
clever close-up photography, the impression was created
that the cars were traveling faster than they actually could.
In short, we believe that falsity is the wrong criterion.
Whatis claimed and what is believed can be quite different,
and it is what is believed that harms consumers.

Misleadingness
The third view, misleadingness, focuses exclusively on
consumer beliefs. A demonstrationof misleadingness requires the observation of false consumer beliefs in conjunction with exposure to the ad. Whereas falsity refers to
a claim-fact discrepancy, misleadingnessrefers to a belieffact discrepancy. During the last two decades, the FTC
alteredits approachto unjust advertising, so that the focus
gradually shifted from the message itself to the resulting
beliefs of consumers. In keeping with this change in focus,
the percentage of FTC advertising cases using behavioral
evidence has increased from four percent prior to 1954 to

41n spite of its general acceptance, some believe that this approachis
bound to fail. They argue that advertisersare too clever and will always
circumventsimple prohibitionson terminology.
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54 percent in the early 1970s (Brandt and Preston 1977).
A thoroughlegal analysis of the variousdefinitionsof unjust
advertising, including the need to rely on consumers' beliefs or "expectations," is presentedby Beales, Craswell,
and Salop (1981).

RATIONALE OF THE PROCEDURE
The proposed procedure for identifying misleading advertisingrequiresthe assessment of consumerbeliefs about
a false claim. This means that consumer beliefs must be
measured and then classified as correct or incorrect. The
incorrectbeliefs must be furtherpartitionedinto those that
can harmconsumersto the benefit of advertisers,and those
thatcannotharmconsumers.Thus, the categoryof incorrect
beliefs is divided into misleadinglyfalse and correctably
false. This coding scheme is most easily explained with an
example.

Misleadingly False Versus CorrectablyFalse
Beliefs
Consider a banana ad that claims "there's only 85 calories [in a banana]." This claim is false because an average
banana contains 101 calories. There are two types of incorrectbeliefs: an average bananacontains fewer than 100
calories (100 is considered correct as a rounded encoding
of 101), or it contains more than 101 calories. Although
both inaccuraciesare potentially harmfulto the consumer,
only the formerserves the advertiser'sgoal of selling more
of the product(except for those very few consumersseeking
more calories). Any belief that calories exceed 101 can be
presumedto be correctableby naturalmarketmechanisms.
That is, the advertiserhas the incentive of increased sales
to correctthe impression that there are more than 101 calories in a banana. We call such beliefs correctablyfalse.
However, if consumersbelieve that calories numberbelow
100, the advertiserbenefits at the expense of the consumer.
These misleadinglyfalse beliefs are the ones that require
extramarketplaceregulation. Therefore, the proposed procedurefor detecting misleading advertisingfocuses only on
these beliefs. As the proposedprocedureis best introduced
throughexample, we describe the experimentthat was performed.

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Summary
Ten magazine ads were selected for testing. All had a
verifiable claim-fact discrepancy, and were independently
correctable. The latter phrase means that the ad can be
alteredto remove all of the misleadingnessand none of the
legitimate persuasiveness. The original and corrected versions, combined with a no-ad (control) treatmentformed
the three treatmentconditions of the experiment.
One hundred consumers were recruited from city and
suburbansocial organizations.They were instructedto read
and evaluate the entire advertisingmessage. They then an-

121

sweredquestions designed to assess belief in the misleading
claim and in an importantlegitimate claim. Responses to
these questions form the evidence on which misleadingness
is to be identified.
Two potentially confounding effects were evaluated and
found to be absent. Beliefs were unaffected by the ads'
construction, which was below professional quality. Different interest levels in purchasinga productdid not affect
the likelihood of a misleading belief.

ConsumerSubjects
One hundred members of PTA, church and women's
organizationswere recruitedas experimentalsubjects. All
organizations were from Chicago area suburbs or city
neighborhoods with middle rankings (median 110 out of
200) on the recent reportsof socioeconomic status of Chicago area communities. Citing her husband'sjob in advertising, one person declined to participate,leaving a sample
of 99. Subjects earned a flat rate of $4.00 for their participation, as well as a 10-cent bonus for correctly answering
each of ten selected questions. Paymentwas creditedto the
subjects' organizations;no payments were made directly to
individuals.
Based on self-reported sociodemographicdata, the average participantwas female, age 39, with slightly more
than two years of college completed, and an annualhousehold income of $25,000. (The 1978 estimatedaverageChicago household income after taxes was $21,679.) Consumers who are above average in income and education
were probably overrepresentedin our sample. Thus, the
reportedresults may not generalize across the entire United
States population. However, as subjects were partitioned
into four groups as demographicallybalanced as possible,
within the time schedule and location constraintsof field
testing, any atypicality was evenly balanced across treatment groups.
At the end of the experimentalsession, participantswere
asked whether they had trouble reading any of the 12 ads.
As the ads contained large amounts of text, it is not surprising that 51 percent reportedsome trouble with at least
one. The 17 subjectswho reportedsome difficultywith four
or more ads were droppedfrom the study. This left a total
of 82 subjects distributedin groups of 19, 17, 26, and 20.
We tested for differences in subject characteristicsacross
these four groups, and found none. An analysis of variance
revealed no significant (p < 0.05) differences for any of
the measured sociodemographic characteristics: income,
education, age, occupation, and numberof younger (under
six years) and older (six to 17 years) children living at
home.

Task
Participating consumers were shown a series of ads.
Their task was to read and comprehendthe entire advertising message, and to evaluate the product. To assure that
the entire message was perceived and understood,subjects
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were asked a simple factual question immediately after
seeing each ad, and were paid a ten-cent bonus for each
correctanswer. To simulaterealisticviewing, subjectswere
also asked if the ad made it more or less likely that they
would purchasethe productor, if the productwas one for
which they had no use, recommend purchaseto a friend.
After all ads had been shown, a second group of questions
was presented. One question was designed to assess misleadingness and the other to measure the effectiveness of
some legitimate claim. In general, the subject's task was
to process each ad completely in preparationfor factual,
evaluative, and substantivequestions.

were exact copies of the ads that appearedin the magazine.
Note that there was no difference in content (pictures and
text) between the untouchedand alteredversions. The latter
merely substitutedidentical typewrittensegments for what
had been typeset in the untouchedoriginals.5For both versions of each ad, we computedthe proportionof consumers
holding misleadingly incorrect beliefs. These proportions
showed no significantdifferences (p < 0.05), either in aggregate or for the four ads tested individually.
After all ads had been prepared,they were photographed
and printed as 2-inch x 2-inch slides. Subjects viewed
these slides at a convenient viewing distance.

AdvertisementsTested

ExperimentalDesign

Ten ads were chosen to satisfy several criteria. First,
therehad to be a verifiableclaim-factdiscrepancy.Because
we had no special testing facilities to verify productclaims,
we had to rely on publicly available criteria or our own
judgment. The public criteria were decisions of the NAD
and a proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule on the use of
nutritionalclaims in food advertising(FederalTradeCommission 1974).
The second selection criterionwas correctability.An ad
is correctableif the misleading claim can be removed without reducingits legitimatepower to persuade.For example,
the bananaad thatfalsely claims 85 calories for what people
presume to be a banana of medium size can be corrected
by substitutingthe true caloric value, 101 calories, for the
false one. This does not change the centrallegitimateclaim
that a bananaand a glass of milk is a superior"60-second
breakfast."
The introductionof correctedversions of each tested ad
restrictedus to print sources. We did not have the facilities
to duplicate and modify broadcastads. Thus, the ten ads
selected for testing were taken from popular magazines,
including 1975-1978 issues of Better Homes and Gardens,
Good Housekeeping, Newsweek, and Redbook.
The ads were also chosen to representa wide variety of
products. They included the following productcategories:
acne treatments (Mudd), automobiles (Chevrolet Nova),
bananas(Dole), breakfastcereals (Cheeriosand Kellogg's),
breakfast drinks (Tang), cigarettes (Carlton), margarine
(Diet Imperialand Fleischmann's), and snack foods (Granola Bars). Summariesof five of these ten ads are presented
in Exhibit 1.

The experimental design contained three homogeneous
and one mixed-treatmentcondition. Each of these conditions contained one version of all ten experimentalads.
The first treatmentcondition contained the ten (cosmetically altered) original ads. The second contained the corrected ads. The third group contained no ads, which is to
say that the same questions were asked of subjects, but
without exposure to any version of the ad. A fourth treatment was mixed. It included the four untouchedoriginals
and variationsof the six other ads.6
The four subject groups should not be confused with the
four treatmentgroups. To counterbalanceany subject differences, each subject group saw two or three ads from
each treatmentcondition in an approximationof a Latin
square design. That is, each subject group saw seven or
eight of the ten ads once, but not in the same treatment
condition. For example, a subject in the first group saw the
originalTang ad, the correctedChevy Nova ad, no version
(the control treatment)of the Fleischmann's ad, and the
unalteredCarlton ad. The results depend only on the differences across treatmentconditions, not subject groups. It
should be rememberedthat within the same treatmentcondition different ads were seen by different subjects. This
will explain the differences in sample sizes within the same
treatmentcondition.

Preparation and Display. We preparedcorrected versions of the ads by removing the misleading part of the
message and substitutinga revised portion. Some revisions
were typed, so the appearanceof the ad clearly showed that
it had been altered.So thatthis "cut-and-paste"appearance
did not differentiallyaffect the correctedversions, cosmetic
alterationswere also made on the original versions. Thus,
both sets of ads appearedequally altered.
To test whether this cosmetic alteration affected consumers'comprehensionof an ad's message, four untouched
original versions were shown. These untouched originals

Procedure
Consumersubjectsparticipatedin small groups(rangeof
group size, four to 11) in a subject's home. After two practice ads and samples of the questions, subjects saw seven
or eight of the ten experimental ads. (Recall that two or
three ads occurredin the no-ad treatment.)In addition, two
or three distractorads were shown. The (cosmeticallymodified) distractorswere includedto reduce any suspicionthat
the ads were selected to be misleading. The exposure time

'The four ads for which both untouchedand cosmetically alteredoriginal versions were preparedare Carltoncigarettes, Diet Imperialmargarine, Fleischmann's margarine,and Tang breakfastdrink.
6Thesevariationsare not relevantto the results reportedhere. They are
described in Russo et al. (1979).
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1
EXHIBIT
ANDCORRECTED
CLAIMSFORSELECTEDADVERTISEMENTS
FALSE,LEGITIMATE,
MISLEADINGLY
Advertised product and type of
claim
Dole bananas
Misleadinglyfalse

"andthere's [sic] only about 85 calories (in a banana)."This numberis true only
for small bananas. A typicalmedium-sizedbanana contains 101 calories.
The centraltheme of the ad is that a banana and a glass of milkare relatively
healthfulas a very fast breakfast.The headline reads "the60-second breakfast
fromDole."
The correctedad substituted101 for 85 in the calorieclaim.

Legitimate
Corrected
Chevy Nova automobile
Misleadinglyfalse

The bottomof the ad prominentlydisplays a pictureof a ChevroletNova witha
price.The car is shown withwhite stripedtires, wheel covers, and body side
molding.The priceshown, $3,823, is not the priceof the car shown. The actual
priceis $3,948, a value that can be obtainedonly by addingthree additional
prices (whitestripedtires $44; wheel covers $39; body side molding$42). These
lattervalues are given in the text of the ad.
The ad's theme is that a Chevy Nova is inexpensive,yet rugged enough to be a
police car.
The boldlyprintedpriceat the bottomof the ad is changed from$3,823 to $3,948.
Thus, the priceshown becomes that of the car shown.

Legitimate
Corrected
NatureValleyGranolabars
Misleadinglyfalse

Legitimate
Corrected

Carltoncigarettes
Misleadinglyfalse

Legitimate
Corrected
Diet Imperialmargarine
Misleadinglyfalse

Legitimate
Corrected

Contentof claim

"NatureValleyGranolabars [are]crunchy,wholesome, delicious."Accordingto a
proposedTrade RegulationRule of the FTCthe word "wholesome"may connote
and cannot be used unless the productsatisfies a minimumstandard
"nutritious"
of nutrition(definedin terms of the percent U.S. RDAof the eight nutrientslisted
on the food label). Granolabars fall far shortof the minimumstandard.
The theme of the ad is that Granolabars are a "100 percent natural"snack. They
contain"no additives[and]no preservatives."The headline is "Go Natural."
The word"wholesome"was removed,eliminatingthe nutritionclaim.This was
judgedto be an advertiser'slikelyresponse. The only alternativepermittedby
the FTC'sproposed rule is the inclusionof a very unflatteringtable of percentof
U.S. RDA.
The ad includesa list of alternative"lowtar"brandsand theirmg. of tar per
cigarette.This list is shown in the left panel of Exhibit2. The alternativebrands
listed are not those lowest in tar. The misleadingimpliedclaim is that no other
"lowtar"brandsare nearlyas low as Carlton;specifically,that even if one
smokes the second lowest brand,one must inhalefive times the tar of Carlton.
The ad truthfully
claims that Carltonhas less than all other brands.This claim is
stated in the headline,"Carltonis lowest."
The misleadingpanel is changed to containthe six brandslowest in mg. of tar, in
orderand withoutomissions, as shown on the rightof Exhibit2.
The ad states no restrictionon the use of Diet Imperial,implyingthat it can be
substitutedfor regularmargarinein any situation.This impliedclaim is true when
margarineis used as a spread, a use picturedin the ad; but it is not truewhen
margarineis used in cooking.As Diet Imperialachieves its caloricreductionby
dilutingregularmargarinewithwater,there is 50 percent less oil per tablespoon.
The centralclaim is that Diet Imperialhas 50 instead of 100 calories per
tablespoon.The headlinereads, "Trydelicious, new Diet Imperial.Stillonly half
the calories of butteror margarine."
A disclaimeris added, "Do not use in baking."

Note: A complete description of all ten ads can be found in Russo, Metcalf, and Stephens (1979).
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for each ad ranged from 30 to 90 seconds, as determined
by laboratoryand field pretests. After viewing each ad, the
subjects answered the factual question and rated the likelihood of purchase. After all ten ads had been seen, they
completeda questionnairethat includedthe questionsabout
misleadingand legitimatebeliefs, a seven-pointratingscale
of interest in the productcategory, reading difficulty, and
various sociodemographiccharacteristics.7

PROCEDURES FOR DETECTION OF
MISLEADINGNESS
The experiment just described provides the following
evidence on which to base a judgment that an ad is misleading: false beliefs held by consumers who did and did
not see an ad, and also by consumers who saw a corrected
version of the same ad. Based on this evidence, how can
a misleading ad be identified?

Criterion1: ConsumerBelief of a False Claim
Is it sufficient to demonstratethat a claim is false and
that people believe the claim? This is a claim-fact discrepancy coupled with direct evidence that people believe the
claim. Many researcherswould answeryes to this question,
with one qualification.8They would require that the percentage of misled consumersexceed some minimum(n percent) needed to declare an ad misleading (Gellhorn 1969;
Jacoby and Small 1975). As has been argued elsewhere,
the problem of finding the best value, or even several values, of n percentis insoluble (Russo 1976). For each ad the
observed percentage of misled consumers must be judged
against its own standard,not against some universally applicable cutoff.
As an example of the belief in a false claim, considerthe
ad for a GranolaBar (Exhibit 1). This productis claimed
to be "wholesome" in the sense of nutritious.Consumers
who saw the original ad were asked their belief about the
nutritionin a GranolaBar. The averagepercentU.S. RDA
7We tested for a possible relation between each consumer's level of
product interest and the likelihood of a misleading belief. In order to
maximize any effect of interest level, only extreme responses were included. The low-interest group qualified by a response of 1 or 2 on the
seven-point scale; inclusion in the high-interestgroup requireda 6 or 7.
A total of 233 low-interestand 184 high-interestresponses were available.
The proportionsmisled were essentially identical, 0.67 for low-interest
and 0.68 for high-interestsubjects.
To test each advertisementindividually, we increasedthe smaller sample size. Those responding3 were added to the low-interestgroup; those
responding 5 were added to the high-interestgroup. No difference was
significant (p < 0.05), except for the Cheerios advertisement.We could
find no reason for this exception, and concluded that it was probably a
false alarm. (Wheneverten tests at ot = 0.05 are performed,at least one
such false alarmwill occur 40 percentof the time.)
8Someresearcherswould not qualify an affirmativeanswerat all. Gardner and Barbour(1980) measuredprice errorsafter exposure to four tire
advertisements.Because the mean erroris large, 26 percent, and "a sizable portionof the sample" held the erroneousbelief, they conclude that
the advertisementsare misleading.

(Recommended Daily Allowance) for the eight "leader"
nutrientswas believed to be 32 percent. The true value is
two percent. Eighty-two percentof consumersbelieved the
average U.S. RDA exceeded five percent. These data indicate extensive belief of a false claim; 82 percent must
surely exceed anyone's n percent cutoff. Nonetheless, the
question remains whether this evidence of a false belief is
sufficient to demonstratethat the Granola Bar ad is misleading. Phraseddifferently, does this evidence show that
the false belief was caused by reading the ad?
Our answer is no. Consumer belief of a false claim is
necessary to demonstratemisleadingness, but it is not sufficient. The problem is simple: this evidence does not exclude the possibility that consumers would hold the same
false belief even if they had not seen the ad.
The design of our experiment permits a test of this alternativehypothesis. In the controltreatmentconsumersubjects answered the same question about nutritionalcontent
without having viewed the ad. The control group's mean
was 28 percent of the U.S. RDA, a value not reliably different from 32 percent. The proportionof people providing
misleadingly false answers also showed no significant difference, 87 percent for no-ad versus 82 percent for the
original ad. Thus, though a claim-fact discrepancy exists
and a large percentageof consumersbelieve the claim, the
evidence does not show that the ad is responsible.
The trouble with identifying misleadingness solely from
false beliefs is that it uses an absolute criterion, n percent
of consumersholding a misleadinglyfalse belief. No matter
how high this cutoff, the level of false belief could exceed
it (and trigger the condemnationof the ad as misleading),
even though the false beliefs were derived entirely from
preexisting misconceptions.

Criterion2: IncreasedBelief in a False Claim
After Exposure to an Advertisement
A second approachrectifies the main flaw of the firstone
by requiringa causal demonstrationof misleadingness.An
ad is identifiedas misleading wheneverexposure to that ad
increases the false belief held by consumers. That is, the
proportionof consumersholding a misleadinglyfalse belief
is greaterfor the groupthat views the ad thanfor the control
group that does not view the ad. We call this incremental
misleadingness. It is probablythe clearest, least controversial form of misleadingness. The rationale for identifying
incrementalmisleadingness is based on a standardbeforeafter comparison in which the before group provides the
criterionagainstwhich the level of false belief is compared.
A comparison similar to this has been proposed by Armstrong, Gurol, and Russ (1978), although Jacoby, Hoyer,
and Sheluga (1980) found this approachto be impractical.
To see how this procedureworks, consider the Dole banana ad described in Exhibit 1. It claims 85 calories per
banana, while the truth is 101. A misleadingly incorrect
answer is anythingless than 100 calories. (Recall that both
100 and 101 calories are considered correct because consumers are likely to encode 101 as "a hundred.") The
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TABLE 1

Exploitive Misleadingness

PROPORTION OF MISLEADINGLYINCORRECT ANSWERS
AFTER VIEWINGORIGINALAD
Advertisement seen
Product
Carlton
Cheerios
Chevy Nova
Diet Imperial
Dole
Fleischmann's
Granola Bar
Kellogg's
Mudd
Tang
Mean

Original
.92 (25)a
.68 (19)
.65b(20)

1.00 (20)
.92b(26)
.94 (17)
.82 (17)
.88 (17)
.82 (17)
.40 (20)
.80

None (Control)
.94
.60
.00
.85
.44
.88
.87
.60
.61
.39

(18)
(20)
(17)
(26)
(36)
(26)
(15)
(20)
(46)
(18)

.62

aNumbers in parentheses are sample sizes.
bp < 0.05.

proportionof misleadingly incorrectbeliefs is 0.92 for the
original group and 0.44 for the control group. This difference is both large and statistically significant (p < 0.05).
We conclude that viewing the ad caused an increase in the
level of false belief, and we find it incrementallymisleading.

The causal assertion of misleadingness can be strengthened by examining those answers that are "exactly misleading," in this case the 85 calories stated in the ad. If
the ad is changingconsumers'beliefs aboutcaloric content,
then more consumers in the original treatmentthan in the
no-ad (control)treatmentshould answerexactly 85 calories.
The proportionsare 0.50 (13 of 26) for the original group
and 0.03 (1 of 36) for the control group, again a significant
difference.
This criterion for misleadingness was applied to all ten
ads. That is, we tested for a higher level of misleadingly
false beliefs in the originaltreatmentthanin the no-ad (control) treatment.Table 1 reportsthe two proportionsand the
results of a chi-square test for their equality.9 Significant
misleadingnesswas found in only two cases, the Dole banana and Chevy Nova ads.
What about the other eight supposedly misleading ads?
Are they really not misleading at all, or only not incrementally misleading? There is at least one other form of
misleadingnessthat Criterion2 overlooks, exploitive misleadingness. The criterion of increased false belief after
exposure to an ad is sufficient evidence of misleadingness,
but it is not necessary. Specifically, it fails to detect non-

incrementalforms of misleadingness.

9Unfortunately,the chi-squaretest is two-tailed, whereasour hypothesis
is one-tailed. However, all nonsignificantp values exceeded 0.10. In one
case (the Kellogg advertisement),all sample size requirementsfor a chisquaretest were not met, and a Fisher's Exact test was used (p = 0.07).

All advertisers feel that changing people's beliefs is a
very difficult task. It takes many exposures, usually to different ads, for a campaign to change beliefs. It is much
easier to link a productto existing beliefs. GranolaBars are
believed to be nutritiousbecause Granola cereal has that
image. Trying to raise the existing belief about nutritional
content would be costly and unnecessary. Better to freeride on this existing belief, reinforcing and utilizing it to
sell the product. We call this exploitive misleadingness.
The advertiserdoes not mislead by increasingfalse beliefs,
but by exploiting those that already exist.
If this type of misleading advertisingexists, how can it
be detected? Obviously, the previous procedurewill fail.
By the very natureof exploitive misleadingnessthere is no
increasein the level of false belief. At least two approaches
are possible. The first is to show an increase in something
other than the misleadingly false belief. The confidence in
the belief and the importance of the belief to an overall
product evaluation are secondary beliefs that may be increased by exposure to the ad. For example, Armstrong,
Gurol, and Russ (1978) found that a Listerine mouthwash
ad increased only the importance of a false belief. This
approachretainsfrom Criterion2 the concept of an increase
as a causal demonstrationof the effect of the ad. However,
it changes the focal observationfrom primaryto secondary
beliefs. The development of this approachis an important
goal of futureresearch.
Alternatively, one can continue to focus directly on the
misleadingly false belief and search for a more sensitive
comparisonthan the no-ad (control) treatment.The second
approach,a more sensitive comparison, forms the basis of
Criterion3.

Criterion3: Less Misleadingly False Beliefs for
CorrectedThan for Original Advertisements
We believe that a properlycorrectedad provides the desired comparison. For each of the ten original ads a corrected version was designed to remove the original claimfact discrepancy, and to affect no other aspects of the ads.
For example, in the GranolaBar ad the word "wholesome"
was eliminated. In the Carlton ad, the table of mg. of tar
for selected brandswas replacedby one containingthe lowest brands, as shown in Exhibit 2.
If a significantlylower level of misleadingly false belief
is producedby the correctedad, we conclude that the product attribute involved in the false claim is perceived by
consumers and exploited by the advertiser. For example,
92 percentof consumersexposed to the original Carltonad
believed-that the brandsecond lowest in tar containedmore
than 1 mg. By comparison, only 40 percent of consumers
who saw the corrected version held this false belief. The
correspondingmean estimate of mg. of tar dropped from
4.5 to 1.9.
Using a correctedversion to providethe standardof comparisoncomforms to a common scientific principle. A com-
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EXHIBIT2

TABLE2

PANELS OF TAR RATINGS FOR COMPETING BRANDS IN THE
CARLTON CIGARETTEADVERTISEMENT

ANSWERS
INCORRECT
OF MISLEADINGLY
PROPORTION
AD
CORRECTED
AFTERVIEWING

Originala
12
Winston Lights
11
Vantage
11
Salem Lights
8
Kent Golden Lights
8
Merit
True
5
1
Carlton Soft Pack
Carlton Menthol less than 1
less than 1
Carlton Box

Corrected
7
Tempo
6
Pall Mall
True
5
3
Iceberg
3
Lucky
Now
1
Carlton Soft Pack
1
Cariton Menthol less than 1
Carlton Box
less than 1

aThese panels occupied about 10 percent of the area of each advertisement.

parison condition should alter only the variableof interest
and hold constant everything else. Because the corrected
ad changes only the misleading component, it is betterable
than the no-ad condition to sense whether consumers are
perceiving, and being exploited by, this misleading component.10The use of a correctedad as the standardof comparison was proposed by Jacoby and Small (1975).
This third criterion was applied to all ten ads. The reduction in the proportionof misleadingly false beliefs between the original and the correctedtreatmentsis shown in
Table 2, along with the resultsof a chi-squaretest for equality of two proportions.Based on this test, six of the ten ads
are found to be misleading: Carlton, Chevy Nova, Diet
Imperial, Dole, GranolaBar, and Tang.
What about the remaining four supposedly misleading
ads? Does this mean that they are actually not misleading?
Possibly, but there is at least one other explanationfor the
failure to find original-correcteddifferences in the proportion of false beliefs. Maybe the corrections were ineffective, either because they were not persuasive, or because
consumers ignored them. For the two ads with nutritional
claims, Cheerios and Kellogg's, evidence indicatedthatthe

'"Cohen(1977) and Wright (1977) have each proposed a similar procedure for identifying misleadingness. Both proposalscompareconsumer
beliefs after exposure to original and correctedads. These proposalsdiffered from ours mainly in the rationale for designing the corrected versions. The authorsof these proposalswork from an informationprovision
strategyin which the correctedad is limited to factual, truthfulclaims. In
the context of the Food and Drug Administration's regulation of drug
advertising, Wright's (1977) corrected ad is "an unadornedtext that describes non-blacklistedconditions the productcan alleviate, in the direct
terms the FDA sanctions" (p. 14). Similarly, Cohen (1977, p. 15) favors
"a true 'barebones' version, closer in substanceand mode of presentation
to what is on the label." Both proposalsdiffer from our strategyof making
the correctedand original ads as similar as possible in all respects, except
the misleading claim. The approachof Cohen and Wright seems to be
motivatedby a belief that many misleadingclaims are manifestthroughout
an ad, including its pictorial and verbal content. Cohen (1977, p. 15)
states that the "use of a 'bare bones' base-line would, in my opinion,
quite properlymake the advertiserresponsiblefor the entire ad." We are
more optimistic that misleadingness can be removed without turningthe
ad into a label.

Product

Corrected
advertisement

Reductioncompared
to original
advertisement

Carlton

.40 (19)'

Cheerios
Chevy Nova

.69 (26)
.16 (19)

Diet Imperial

.24 (17)

Dole

.20 (20)

Fleischmann's
GranolaBar

.95 (19)
.56 (16)

Kellogg's

.92 (26)

.26b
-.04

Mudd
Tang

.74 (19)
.12 (17)

.28b

Mean

.50

.30

.52b

-.01
.49b
.76b
.72b

-.01
.08

aNumbers in parentheses are sample sizes.

bp < 0.05.

correctionwas ineffective. " In general, however, it is not
possible to discriminatebetween a poor correctionand the
absence of exploitive misleadingness.

What is a ProperCorrection?
Not every correctedad can legitimately serve as a comparison to the original. For example, in the extreme it is
possible to correct an ad by gutting it, that is by destroying
its ability to communicate any productclaims, misleading
or otherwise. Such an alterationis obviously improper.
Two aspects of the correctionare critical: independence,
or whether reducing the misleading claim interferes with
the persuasiveness of legitimate claims, and informativeness, or how much the correction depends on providing
correctinginformation.
IndependentCorrection. The correctionshould reduce
the misleading belief without affecting legitimate persuasiveness. This has not always been easy to achieve. At least
two studies tested the FTC correctionof Listerine ads and
found attenuationof belief in claims other than the target
of correction (Dyer and Kuehl 1978; Mazis and Adkinson
1976). 12
Recall that the ten ads were selected partly on the basis
of a clear separationbetween the misleading claim and an
importantlegitimate claim. If the corrections were independent, consumer belief in these legitimate claims should
be just as high for the correctedads as for the originalones.
The critical proportionsare shown in Table 3.
The mean proportionsshow no difference between the
"The details of this analysis can be found in Russo et al. (1979).
'2Note that we tested only one legitimate claim for each ad. To show
that one claim is not infirmedis not to show that all were not. However,
we did try to select a major thematic claim whenever possible, and it is
fair to say that the present results could not be more supportiveof the
assertionthat legitimate persuasivenesswas preserved.
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TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF CORRECT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
ASSESSING LEGITIMATEPERSUASIVENESS
Version of the advertisement
Product
Carlton
Cheerios
Chevy Nova
Diet Imperial
Dole
Fleischmann's
Granola Bar
Kellogg's
Mudd
Tang
Mean

Corrected
.95
.88
.79
.88
.90
.16
.65
.42
1.00
.65

Original

(20)'
(26)
(19)
(17)
(20)
(19)
(20)
(26)
(19)
(17)

.92
.95
.90
.90
.92
.06
.69
.53
1.00
.45

.73

.73

(26)
(19)
(20)
(20)
(26)
(17)
(16)
(17)
(17)
(20)

No
advertisement
.28
.65
.35
.46
.89
.27
.18
.15
.80
.39

(18)
(20)
(17)
(26)
(36)
(26)
(17)
(20)
(46)
(18)

.44

aNumbers in parentheses are sample sizes.

correctedand original treatmentgroups. Tests of individual
ads also reveal no significant differences. To make clear
that both versions were genuinely persuasive, the proportion of correct responses for the no-ad treatment is also
shown in Table 3. The corrected and original treatments
exhibit a much higher belief level than does the no-ad
group: 0.73 versus 0.44 on the average. We conclude that
the correctionswere independentin that they did not reduce
the considerable legitimate persuasiveness of the original
ads.
Informativeness. There are two corrective strategies:
provide nonmisleading information, or cease mentioning
the misleading attribute. Because the misleading table of
alternativebrandsin the Carltonad was replaced, as shown
in Exhibit 2, the correction was informative. If the misleading table had been removed withoutbeing replaced, the
correction would have been uninformative. The Granola
Bar ad was uninformativelycorrectedby droppingthe nutritional claim, "wholesome." In contrast, it could have
been informativelycorrected by adding a table of percent
of U.S. RDA (Russo et al. 1979).
An uninformativecorrection is not always possible. If
the misleading belief is not explicitly activated by some
component of the original ad, there is nothing to remove.
The only way to correct such an ad is to add information.
The Diet Imperial margarineadvertisementprovides such
an example (Exhibit 1). To correctthe false belief that Diet
Imperialcan be used in cooking (which it cannot because
it is 50 percent water), an informativedisclaimerhad to be
added.
Both the informativeand uninformativecorrectionsprovide valuable evidence about the level of exploitive misleadingness. The uninformativedoes less correcting, and
will almost certainly be the choice of advertisers. It also
provides the more conservative test. We expect a smaller

original-correcteddifference in misleading belief when the
correctionis uninformative.Not saying anythingought not
to reduce a false belief as much as telling people the truth.
Forced Education. Advertisersmay claim thatby comparing an ad to its correctedversion they are being held to
an unreasonablestandard.They are being requiredto educate the public. Not only might such a requirementviolate
their freedom of speech, but it would be impossible for an
ad to provide enough factual informationto correct every
existing false belief.
This argumentis groundless. A regulatoryorganization
is often justified in requiringthat the advertiserexplicitly
provideinformationin orderto decreasesome existing false
belief (Beales et al. 1981). A warningon the use of a drug
is a common example. The disclaimer that Diet Imperial
margarineshould not be used in cooking is anotherexample. The question of whether to reduce misleadingness by
requiringadditionalinformationin an ad really involves the
severity of harm. This, in turn, is a question of utility and
action selection. Although it is essential in any regulatory
context, we would like to keep it separateas long as possible from the more scientific question of the existence of
misleadingness. We returnto this topic later.

Summaryof RecommendedProcedure
The prerequisiteto our recommendedprocedurefor identifying misleading advertisingis empiricalevidence of consumer belief. Specifically, we requirethe proportionsof a
representative group of potential purchasers that hold a
misleadinglyfalse belief afterexposure to: the original ad,
one or more correctedversions, and no ad at all.
Given this evidence, the identification of incremental
misleadingnessis straightforward.If the level of misleading
belief is (statistically significantly) higher for the original
group than for the no-ad (control) group, then the ad is
found to be incrementallymisleading. Exposure to the ad
increases the level of false belief.
Exploitive misleadingness occurs when the ad does not
increase, but free-rides on, an existing level of misleading
belief. If the level of misleading belief is (statisticallysignificantly)higher for the original ad than for the corrected
version, the ad is found to be exploitively misleading. The
selection of a corrected version is critical. The most conservativecorrectionis both independentand uninformative.
This provides the most conservative test.

THEORETICAL ISSUES
The n Percent Problem
The inadequacyof Criterion 1 is essentially a statement
about the insolubility of the n percent problem. The difficulty with establishing a single standardof n percent (or
even a sliding standard) is that this task confounds two
concepts, the existence of misleadingness and its importance. Criterion2, for identifying incrementalmisleading-
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ness, succeeds precisely because it separatesexistence from
importance.It accomplishesthis in the same way that classical statistical hypothesis testing separates statistical significance from practicalimportance.When statisticaltechniques show that there is significantly more misleading
belief in the original group than in the no-ad (control)
group, all we have demonstratedis that misleadingnessexists. There is no judgment about the importance of that
misleadingness, in terms of the seriousness of the potential
harm to consumers.'3
The judgment of seriousness depends on the nature of
the advertisedclaim. In our procedureit remains, as it must
remain, the prerogativeof the regulator. It is worth noting
that as n percent increases, both the existence and seriousness of misleadingness increase. This partly explains why
these separateissues have been confused in the past.

Remedial Action and Utility
If an ad is misleading, what remedial action, if any,
should be taken? The problem of action selection is, of
course, one of judging the severity of harm to consumers.
In principle, the existence and severity of misleadingness
are separate issues. In practice this distinction cannot always be achieved.
Consideran (hypothetical)ad for Efficax, a new powerful
nonprescriptionpain reliever. Efficax has only one qualification, it relieves all but one common pain, say, angina
of effort. (This is the temporarypain caused by too little
blood to a working muscle.) As consumers' past experiences are only with drugs that relieve all common pain, it
is likely that an initial advertising campaign will find a
linkage between the legitimate belief of the relief of most
pain and the misleading belief of angina relief. The more
effectively an ad persuadesconsumersof Efficax's power,
the more it is apt to increase the level of false belief, even
with a clear disclaimer that angina is excluded. Such an
effective ad might, according to Criterion2, be identified
as incrementallymisleading. However, the net benefit to
society could still be positive, because the benefit of the
legitimate belief might outweigh the damage of the misleadingly false belief.
This example illustratesa situationthat affects the applicability of Criterion3 for detecting exploitive misleading-

'3A remaining problem is determiningthe appropriatesample size of
the test of misleadingness. A close analysis will reveal that the issue of
sample size reintroducesthe judgment of seriousness of harm, but in a
less damaging way. Ideally, the appropriatesample size is partially determinedby the utilities of the two statisticalerrors(Hamburg1970). The
more harmful a given level of misleadingness, the more importantis its
detection and the largershould be the sample size. The appropriatesample
size is a decision that should be jointly made by researchersand policy
makers. Although it is an untidy remnant of the n percent problem, it
should affect only a few marginaldeterminationsof misleadingness.These
cases will occur when relatively few people are misled, but the potential
damage is great, such as a misleading drug ad to physicians.

ness. The legitimate and misleading beliefs may be interdependent.The promotingof Efficax as powerful increases
both the legitimate and misleading claims. These beliefs
are similar and naturallylinked.
For the ten ads that we corrected and tested, legitimate
persuasivenesswas undiminished. In each case the legitimate and misleading beliefs were independent.In general,
however, we cannot expect independence among beliefs.
And once the legitimate and misleading claims are linked,
correctioncomes only at the expense of legitimate persuasiveness. Because some correctioncan always be attained
(if necessary, by turningthe ad into an informativelabel),
the use of the correctedad as a comparisonloses its validity.
Thus, we stop short of applying Criterion3 to the case of
a link between the misleading and legitimate beliefs.
This is not to say that regulatorscannot honestly find an
ad misleading in the face of such a linkage. But to do so
they must consider severity of damage, or disutility. For
example, if a correction lowered the legitimate belief by
one percent and the misleading belief by 40 percent, the
regulating agency might well find the ad misleading or,
more properly, unnecessarily misleading.

Note that this

judgment implicitly involves the relative utilities of a one
percentdecrease in the legitimatebelief versus a 40 percent
decrease in the misleadingbeliefs. Normallyone would opt
for the 40 percent and sacrifice the one percent, but not
always. The decision must depend on the specific utilities
(Beales et al. 1981).
Although we restrict our procedure to the independent
case, we suggest that one topic of future research is the
formal extension of the procedure to action selection. Such

an extension would incorporateutility judgments, possibly
the marginalutilities of the various decreases in the legitimate and misleading belief levels caused by differentcorrections.

A Definition of Misleadingness
The conventionalstrategy for measuringmisleadingness
starts with a definition of misleading advertising and develops a measurementprocedureby operationalizingthat
definition(Jacobyand Small 1975; Olson and Dover 1978).
We have reversed that process, first constructinga procedure and now defining misleadingness:
An advertisementis misleading if it creates, increases, or
exploits a false belief about expected productperformance.

The key words in this definition are "belief" and
"false." We focus on what consumers believe as a result
of reading an ad, regardlessof what the ad claims or what
the advertiser intended it to claim. We also require that
resulting beliefs not be false, i.e., that the expectation of
productbenefits be justified. This definition is compatible
with several other "behavioral" definitionsof misleadingness, especially those of Gardner (1976) and Olson and
Dover (1978).
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OtherMeasures of Misleadingness: Percent
Misled Versus Amount Misled
The only evidence used by the proposedprocedureis the
percentageof misled consumers. A measureof the amount
of misleadingness would provide more information from
the same number of consumer subjects. For example, the
size of the misleadingness in the Carltonad could be measuredby how far above 1 mg. each consumerbelieved the
second lowest brand to be. That is, instead of scoring responses of 2 and 10 mg. as identically incorrect,the greater
errorreflected by the 10 mg. belief could be preservedby
measuring the size of these two errors as 1 and 9 mg.,
respectively.
Although numerical measures of misleadingness would
increasethe efficiency of the test procedure,they have their
disadvantages.The proportionof misled consumersis more
intuitively understandablethan a correspondingnumerical
measure. Also, across ads the proportionremains comparable, whereas different numerical measures would be required, such as mg. of tar for one, percent of U.S. RDA
for another,and so forth. Nonetheless, the use of numerical
measuresshould not be excluded, but ratherexplored. Their
advantagesmay be essential in some situations.

APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURE
Puffery
The proposedprocedureapplies to all advertisingclaims,
includingpuffs. These are transparentexaggerations, often
in the form of superlatives("the finest beer you can buy")
or hyperbole ("pain relief so effective you'll think you're
20 again"). The law considers the falsity of such claims so
transparentas to renderthem harmless. Consumersare assumed to see through the exaggeration, and to place no
credence in puffed claims (Preston 1975; Rotfeld 1979).
Essentially, the law embodies two extreme assumptions
aboutthe beliefs of consumers: fact-basedclaims are credible to all, while puffs are credible to none.14
The procedureproposed here makes no distinction between puffs and other claims. More generally, the increasing use of behavioral evidence should reduce, and eventually eliminate, the distinction between puffed and factbased claims (Oliver 1979).
This is not to say that the problem of puffery in advertising is now solved, because the elusiveness of puffed advertising reappearsin a different form. Recall that besides
demonstratingbelief in the claim, our procedurerequires
thatthe claim be verifiablyfalse. To identify a puffed claim
as misleading, one must be able to demonstrate that the

this dichotomy has been necessary. Regulatoryjudg"4Unfortunately,
ment of fact-basedclaims, like those tested in our experiment, is difficult
enough. The additionalburdenof puffed claims would have strainedthe
existing jurisprudentialsystem past endurance.
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correspondingbelief is false. How do we decide whether
Giordano's really makes "the best pizza in Chicago," or
that some hair transplant"will restore your sense of manhood"? Depending on the regulatorycriteriafor verifying
such falsity, this demonstrationcan be more or less difficult. Nonetheless, by abandoningthe presumptionthat no
one ever believes puffery, and substitutinga test for misleadingness based on measured consumer beliefs, we can
begin to deal with the real impact of puffed claims on consumers' beliefs and purchases.

Limitations
Verifiability. The proposed procedurerequiresthat the
allegedly misleadingclaim/belief be verifiablytrueor false.
This becomes problematicalwhen the beliefs are evaluative
and subjectiveratherthanfactual. Is a cigarettead's implicit
claim that the smoker will appear more sophisticatedobviously false? A simple yes or no answer is not possible.
Although many people would agree that the primaryoutcome of cigarettesmoking is the risk of lung cancer, many
teenage girls see cigarettes as genuinely conferring a sophisticatedstatus.15
A task of futureresearchis the developmentof methods
for verifying claims that are essentially evaluative/subjective. One hopeful factor is that a misleadingclaim, such as
enhanced sophistication, may engender many subclaims.
Misleadingnesscan be demonstratedwith any one of these.
Thus, if misleadingness is genuinely present, the problem
of verifiabilitymay be overcome by finding any verifiable
subclaim.
Creating the Correction. For some ads a correction
may be possible in theory only. Consider a TV ad for a
health-related,but not medical, productsuch as a breakfast
cereal without chemical additives. The advertiser might
misleadinglyimply a medical claim by dressingthe spokesperson in a white lab coat or setting the testimonial in a
hospital. Correctionof such an ad is straightforward,exchange the lab coat and hospital setting for typical nonmedical counterparts.But, what if the spokespersonis an actor
who is closely identified with his role as a physician in a
movie or TV series? It may not be possible to find a "corrected" actor, one with no false medical image, but with
equal appeal and legitimate credibility.
Devising a proper corrected ad requires cleverness and
effort. Like its reflection, the controlgroup in experimental
science, the corrected ad may pose practical difficulties,
but at least the goal is clear.

"5Apsychologically deep issue underliesthis phenomenon.Expectations
can influence reality, especially social reality. Your chance of appearing
to others as sophisticated(or sexy or friendly)increases if you believe that
you are sophisticated(or sexy or friendly). The communicationby ads of
such "social psychological representations"has been examinedby Shimp
(1979).
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NaturalisticMeasurement
For a valid assessment of consumer belief, the ad must
firstbe presentedas naturalisticallyas possible. This might
mean embedding a print ad in editorial material and a
broadcastad in regularprogramming(Collins and Jacobson
1978). It might also requiremultiple exposures ("Multiple
ExposureTest Needed to EvaluateCommercials" 1979) or
testing on split-samplecable TV to obtain matchedgroups
of viewers (Mizerski, Allison, and Calvert 1980). In general, the goal is to create a naturalexposure context, often
with so-called "low involvement" by the consumer(Mitchell 1979; Mitchell, Russo, and Gardner1981). Advertisers
have developed many techniques for naturalisticpresentation and, within cost constraints,we recommendtheir use.
Even with naturalisticpresentation,however, one must
still measurebeliefs nonreactively.A nonreactivemeasurement technique is one that does not change the behaviorit
is trying to measure (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest 1966). Suppose that we want to know how advertising affects the beliefs of potentialpurchasersof state lottery
tickets about their chances of winning. They are exposed
to a persuasive ad that emphasizes the wonderful ways of
spending one million dollars. If we now ask, "What do
you think your chances are of winning the million-dollar
grand prize?" most would correctly respond that their
chances are small. But this response probablyreflects the
effect of the question, not what it was supposedto measure,
the effect of the message. Answering the question activates
a rational considerationof the probabilityof winning that
would not otherwise occur. Such questions would never be
asked under normalconditions of exposure to an ad. If we
were then to measurepurchaseintention, we would almost
certainly find it lower than that of an exposed group not
asked the misleading question.
The problem of reactivity to the measurementprocedure
is worse for questions about misleadingness. Because such
beliefs are false, deliberation about them is more apt to
reverse them. Simple solutions to the problem of nonreactive measurementdo not exist. Each case requiresa different creative approachto posing a question subtly enough
that people respond without reacting.

Use By Advertisers
If a standardizedprocedure for identifying misleadingness were established, advertisers could pretest to avoid
regulatoryaction. If they knew the evidence that the NAD
or FTC would use to judge misleadingness, they could collect that evidence priorto public exposure of the ad. There
would be no need to second guess regulators'judgments.
Besides helping to avoid costly regulatoryaction, a pretest may reveal that the misleading claim is not essential to
selling the product. One of the striking findings of our experimentis thatthe main thrustof the ads was not attenuated
by removal of the misleading claim. Consumers still believed that Carltonis lowest in tar or that a Chevy Nova is
good enough to be a police car. Our procedure enables

advertisersto evaluatethe contributionof any specific claim
(not only a possibly misleading claim) to a majorthematic
belief about the product.

Use By Regulators
Standardized procedures reduce both the cost and the
uncertaintyof regulatoryaction. Beyond these advantages,
the use of our procedureover time poses some interesting
possibilities. The cumulative body of empirical evidence
would constitutea partialcensus of misleading advertising.
Types of claims that are particularlytroublesomecould be
exposed. One could also map the various values of n percent of consumers who hold false beliefs. It would be interesting to know for which product category advertising
is the most misleading, and for which the level of false
belief is highest.
This type of census can be used to help establish longrangeprioritiesfor the regulatoryagency, such as those that
exist in the field of consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction
(Hunt 1977). A census of dissatisfaction across product
categories reveals where dissatisfaction is highest and remedial action most needed.16
[ReceivedDecember 1980. Revised March 1981.]
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